I work and teach in metaphysics (i.e., philosophy). As a true Swiftian, my work so far falls into three eras:
Era One: I wrote about the epistemology of symmetries (papers 7, 8, 17), metaphysical implications of symmetries (1, 2, 3, 6, 10, 16), and grounding (4, 5, 9). I was going to write a book about all this called "Empirical Rationalism", but it never happened.
Era Two: I wrote about a normative argument for anti-realism about the true (23, 24), the good (12, 13, 20, 22), and the metaphysical (11, 14, 15, 21). I was going to write a book about all this called "Transcendental Pragmatism", but it never happened. (19 summarizes the first third of this non-existent book.)
Era Three: I am now working on what I call 'analytic mysticism', the project of using analytic metaphysics to verify core themes in mystical experiences such as that distinctions aren't real, the self is an illusion, and reality is ineffable (25, 26). I am going to write a book about all this called "The Metaphysics of Mystical Experience", thus demonstrating that the future does not always resemble the past.
Papers in progress
- Immanent Monism
Draft of October 2025 - Being and Emptiness
New draft coming soon - Truth and Correspondence: Putnam's Paradox Revisited
Draft of January 2026 - Undoing the Truth Fetish: The Normative Path to Pragmatism
Forthcoming in Midwest Studies in Philosophy - Practical Nihilism
Forthcoming in Oxford Studies in Metaethics - Objectivity as a Normative Notion (Twice Over)
In New Essays on Normative Realism (2025), edited by Paul Boghossian and Christopher Peacocke (OUP), pp. 141-162. - Quietism and Normative Symmetry
Analysis 84.4 (2024): 869-882. - From Plotinus to Rorty: A History of Philosophy Without Any Gaps
In Extreme Philosophy: Bold Ideas and a Spirit of Progress (2024), edited by Stephen Hetherington (Routledge), pp. 29-46. - School in the Time of Covid
Monash Bioethics Review 40 (2022): 120-144 - Symmetry and Superfluous Structure: A Metaphysical Overview
In The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Physics (2021), edited by Eleanor Knox and Alastair Wilson (Routledge), pp. 551-563. - How to Be a Relationalist
Oxford Studies in Metaphysics: Volume 12 (2021): 113-163. - Privilege in the Construction Industry
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98.2 (2019): 489-496 - Realism and the Absence of Value
The Philosophical Review 127.3 (2018): 279-322. - Essentialism and the Nonidentity Problem
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96.3 (2018): 540-570 - Normative Non-Naturalism and the Problem of Authority
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 117.3 (2017): 297-319. - Constitutive Explanation
Philosophical Issues 27 (2017): 74-97. - Can We Do Without Fundamental Individuals? Yes
In Current Controversies in Metaphysics, edited by Elizabeth Barnes (2017): 7-23. Previously titled "Quality and Structure". - Metaphysical Rationalism
Noûs 50.2 (2016): 379-418. Selected for inclusion in the Philosopher's Annual. - Symmetry as an Epistemic Notion (Twice Over)
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 67.3 (2016): 837-878. - Inexpressible Ignorance
The Philosophical Review 124.4 (2015): 441-480. - Substantivalism vs Relationalism About Space In Classical Physics
Philosophy Compass 10.9 (2015): 601-624. - The Possibility of Physicalism
The Journal of Philosophy 111.9 (2014): 557-592 - On the Plurality of Grounds
Philosophers' Imprint 14.14 (2014): 1-28. - Absolutism vs Comparativism about Quantity
Oxford Studies in Metaphysics: Volume 8 (2013): 105-148. Winner of the Sanders Prize in Metaphysics, 2011. - The Bare Necessities
Philosophical Perspectives 25 (2011): 115-160. - Individuals: An Essay in Revisionary Metaphysics
Philosophical Studies 145.1 (2009): 35-67.
In which I develop a form of existence monism inspired by Advaita Vedanta and explore its implications regarding the nature of the self, the limits of thought, and a rationale for spiritual practice.
In which I develop a metaphysics of emptiness and show that it entails a number of themes associated with Madhyamaka Buddhism, such as that the path of inquiry leads not to thesis but to silence.
In which I argue that in his 'internal realism' era, Hilary Putnam did not Putnam hard enough.
Publications
In which I develop a broadly pragmatist view of truth, inquiry, justification, and meaning.
In which I argue that there are no right or wrong answers to practical questions of what to do, who to be, or what to value. There is no distinguished way to live; they are all on a par.
In which I argue that objectivity is a normative notion (twice over).
In which I argue that metaethical quietists cannot break the symmetry between reasons and schmeasons, and therefore cannot secure metaethical objectivity. This is part of a symposium on Andrew Sepielli's book Pragmatist Quietism.
In which I argue that either all of reality has a purely normative source, a la Plotinus; or the true and the good are just social constructions with no objective basis, a la Richard Rorty. Those are your options: Plotinus or Rorty. There is no in between.
In which I argue that school closures during the Covid-19 pandemic were a moral catastrophe.
In which I outline the method of symmetry and its application to metaphysics.
In which I describe how to be a relationalist, and while doing so develop a non-factualist account of measurement and distinguish two species of metaphysical possibility.
In which I discuss issues of egalitarianism and privilege that arise in Karen Bennett's book Making Things Up. (For an invited symposium in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.)
In which I raise a problem for metaphysical realism and suggest a return to a Goodmanian view that the world is a structureless mess onto which we project our own categorizations, not something with categories already built in.
In which I ask: out of all the many entities coincident with a person, that differ only in their essential profiles, which ones matter? I use nonidentity cases to shed light on this question.
In which I develop a familiar argument against normative non-naturalism, to the effect that non-natural properties would have no "normative authority" over us.
In which I argue that the notion of ground can be significantly deflated and still do useful work in philosophy.
In which I argue that the world is a purely qualitative mosaic. Here is the postscript, coauthored with Jason Turner.
In which I develop and defend a version of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, one that entails that every truth is necessarily true.
In which I argue that symmetry is an epistemic notion (twice over).
In which I discuss cases where ignorance is inexpressible (e.g. ignorance of absolute position, quiddities, and haecceities) and argue that the ignorance consists in an inability to identify things by way of their natures.
In which I survey a number of arguments for each view (including the bucket argument, Leibniz shift arguments, and symmetry arguments) and conclude that the case for relationalism is strong. Here is the teaching and learning guide.
In which I argue that the notion of ground is suitable for formulating a variety of metaphysical theses, including physicalism.
In which I argue that ground is an irreducibly plural notion: these are grounded in those. Cases of plural grounding include individuals and quantities like kilograms.
In which I motivate and defend comparativism about quantities like mass.
In which I discuss substantivalism in the context of the General Theory Relativity, and argue that we do not yet have a satisfactory substantivalist theory.
In which I argue that (fundamentally speaking) there are no such things as individuals.
Teaching
I teach undergraduate and graduate classes. I also supervise PhD dissertations and undergraduate honors theses. If you would like me to write a letter of recommendation for you, please let me know as early as possible so that we can plan accordingly. To write an effective letter I will need to follow your progress for some time.
Below is a list of previous courses. Those up to 2016 were taught at Princeton; those since 2017 were taught at UC Berkeley.
Graduate seminars
2024 Spring: The Philosophy and History of Automated Decision Making (with Ben Recht)
2023 Spring: Objectivity
2021 Spring: Pragmatism
2018 Fall: First-Year Seminar (with John MacFarlane)
2018 Spring: Why is There Anything Except Physics? (with Geoffrey Lee)
2015 Fall: Metaphysics (with Boris Kment)
2014 Spring: Symmetry, Structure, and Spacetime
2013 Spring: Medieval, Early Modern, and Contemporary Work on Substance (with John Morrison)
2011 Spring: Hyperintensional Metaphysics (with Boris Kment)
2009 Fall: The Structure of the Physical World
Undergraduate courses
Since 2014 many of my undergraduate courses have used a "levels system". This is a series of assignments that students complete at their own pace through the semester; see here for an example. Since 2016 the assignments have typically involved constructing argument maps; see here for an introduction to argument maps. I have now accumulated a stock of assignments and maps for these courses, please email me if you would like access to them.
2020 Spring: Phil 5 Science and Human Understanding; Phil 128 Philosophy of Science
2019 Fall: Phil 100 Philosophical Methods
2019 Spring: Phil 100 Philosophical Methods; Phil 125 Metaphysics
2018 Fall: Phil 5 Science and Human Understanding
2018 Spring: Phil 128 Philosophy of Science
2017 Fall: Phil 5 Science and Human Understanding
2016 Spring: Phi 321 Philosophy of Science
2014 Fall: FRS 187 Philosophical Analysis Using Argument Maps (led by Simon Cullen)
2014 Spring: Phi 203 Introduction to Metaphysics and Epistemology
2013 Fall: Phi 318 Metaphysics
2012 Fall: Phi 201 Introductory Logic
2012 Spring: Phi 321 Philosophy of Science
2011 Fall: Phi 203 Introduction to Metaphysics and Epistemology
2011 Spring: Phi 201 Introductory Logic
2009 Fall: Phi 203 Introduction to Metaphysics and Epistemology (with Gideon Rosen)
2007 Summer: Ethics (at NYU)
PhD supervision
Currently supervising dissertations by:
- Teague Morris (Berkeley; Co-Chair)
- Hannah DeBrine (Berkeley; Co-Chair)
- Daniel Villalon (Berkeley; Co-Chair)
Previous dissertations supervised:
- Patrick Ryan (Berkeley 2023; Co-Chair)
- Ravit Dotan (Berkeley 2021; Co-Chair)
- Daniel Berntson (Princeton 2019; primary advisor)
- Samuel Z. Elgin (Yale 2018; external advisor)
- Nat Tabris (Princeton 2018; primary advisor)
- Robin Dembroff (Princeton 2017; primary advisor)
- Li Kang (Syracuse 2017; external advisor)
- Robbie Hirsch (Princeton 2017; secondary advisor)
- Michaela McSweeney (Princeton 2016; primary advisor)
- Zee Perry (NYU 2016, external advisor)
The pasture
Here is some work that I am putting out to pasture.
The Meta-Ethics of AI: Are Machines Beholden to Normative Joints?
Draft of November 2020
In which I argue that there are no right or wrong answers to questions of AI ethics, because they turn on which ethical concepts to use and there is no right or wrong answer to that. I posted this in November 2020 but by 2024 much of the content had morphed into "Practical Nihilism"; I leave this earlier draft here for reference.
Undoing the Truth Fetish: The Normative Path to Pragmatism (Old Draft)
Draft of April 2020
In which I motivate a broadly pragmatist view of inquiry, truth, justification, and meaning. I posted this draft in April 2020 and it remained up until November 2024. The new version (forthcoming, above) is very different, but since this earlier draft was up for so long I leave it here for reference.