Work in progress
Inexpressible Ignorance (Draft of July 2014)
...in which I discuss cases where ignorance is inexpressible (e.g. ignorance of absolute position, quiddities, and haecceities) and argue that the ignorance consists in an inability to identify things by way of their natures.
Substantivalism vs Relationalism About Space In Classical Physics forthcoming in Philosophy Compass.
...in which I survey a number of arguments for each view (including the bucket argument, Leibniz shift arguments, and symmetry arguments) and conclude that the case for relationalism is better than is often acknowledged.
The Possibility of Physicalism forthcoming in The Journal of Philosophy.
...in which I argue that the notion of ground is suitable for formulating a variety of metaphysical theses including physicalism.
Metaphysical Rationalism forthcoming in Noûs.
...in which I develop and defend a version of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, one that entails that every truth is necessarily true.
Symmetry as an Epistemic Notion (Twice Over) forthcoming in The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
...in which I argue that symmetry is an epistemic notion (twice over).
Quality and Structure forthcoming in Current Controversies in Metaphysics, edited by Elizabeth Barnes (Routledge).
...in which I argue that the world is a purely qualitative mosaic. Here is the postscript, coauthored with Jason Turner.
On the Plurality of Grounds Philosophers' Imprint 14.14 (2014): 1-28.
...in which I argue that ground is an irreducibly plural notion: these are grounded in those. Cases of plural grounding include individuals and quantities like kilograms.
Absolutism vs Comparativism about Quantity Oxford Studies in Metaphysics: Volume 8 (2013). Winner of the 2011 OSM Younger Scholars Prize.
...in which I motivate and defend comparativism about quantities like mass.
The Bare Necessities Philosophical Perspectives 25 (2011): 115-160.
...in which I discuss substantivalism in the context of the General Theory Relativity, and argue that we do not yet have a satisfactory substantivalist theory.
Individuals: An Essay in Revisionary Metaphysics Philosophical Studies 145.1 (2009): 35-67.
...in which I argue that (fundamentally speaking) there are no such things as individuals.