Work in progress
Undoing the Truth Fetish: The Normative Path to Pragmatism draft of Jan 2019
In which I motivate a broadly pragmatist view of truth, meaning, and inquiry.
How to Be a Relationalist draft of Sept 2018
In which I describe how to be a relationalist, and while doing so develop a non-factualist account of measurement and distinguish two species of metaphysical possibility.
Privilege in the Construction Industry draft of February 2018
In which I discuss issues of egalitarianism and privilege that arise in Karen Bennett's book Making Things Up. (For an invited symposium in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.)
Symmetry and Superfluous Structure: A Metaphysical Overview draft of February 2018
In which I outline the method of symmetry and its application to metaphysics.
Realism and the Absence of Value The Philosophical Review 127.3 (2018): 279-322.
In which I raise a problem for metaphysical realism and suggest a return to a Goodmanian view that the world is a structureless mess onto which we project our own categorizations, not something with categories already built in.
Essentialism and the Nonidentity Problem Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96.3 (2018): 540-570
In which I ask: out of all the many entities coincident with a person, that differ only in their essential profiles, which ones matter? I use nonidentity cases to shed light on this question.
Normative Non-Naturalism and the Problem of Authority Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 117.3 (2017): 297-319.
In which I develop a familiar argument against normative non-naturalism, to the effect that non-natural properties would have no "normative authority" over us.
Constitutive Explanation Philosophical Issues 27 (2017): 74-97.
In which I argue that the notion of ground can be significantly deflated and still do useful work in philosophy.
Quality and Structure forthcoming in Current Controversies in Metaphysics, edited by Elizabeth Barnes (Routledge).
In which I argue that the world is a purely qualitative mosaic. Here is the postscript, coauthored with Jason Turner.
Metaphysical Rationalism Noûs 50.2 (2016): 379-418.
In which I develop and defend a version of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, one that entails that every truth is necessarily true.
Symmetry as an Epistemic Notion (Twice Over) The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 67.3 (2016): 837-878.
In which I argue that symmetry is an epistemic notion (twice over).
Inexpressible Ignorance The Philosophical Review 124.4 (2015): 441-480.
In which I discuss cases where ignorance is inexpressible (e.g. ignorance of absolute position, quiddities, and haecceities) and argue that the ignorance consists in an inability to identify things by way of their natures.
Substantivalism vs Relationalism About Space In Classical Physics Philosophy Compass 10.9 (2015): 601-624.
In which I survey a number of arguments for each view (including the bucket argument, Leibniz shift arguments, and symmetry arguments) and conclude that the case for relationalism is better than is often acknowledged. Here is the teaching and learning guide.
The Possibility of Physicalism The Journal of Philosophy 111.9 (2014): 557-592
In which I argue that the notion of ground is suitable for formulating a variety of metaphysical theses including physicalism.
On the Plurality of Grounds Philosophers' Imprint 14.14 (2014): 1-28.
In which I argue that ground is an irreducibly plural notion: these are grounded in those. Cases of plural grounding include individuals and quantities like kilograms.
Absolutism vs Comparativism about Quantity Oxford Studies in Metaphysics: Volume 8 (2013). Winner of the 2011 OSM Younger Scholars Prize.
In which I motivate and defend comparativism about quantities like mass.
The Bare Necessities Philosophical Perspectives 25 (2011): 115-160.
In which I discuss substantivalism in the context of the General Theory Relativity, and argue that we do not yet have a satisfactory substantivalist theory.
Individuals: An Essay in Revisionary Metaphysics Philosophical Studies 145.1 (2009): 35-67.
In which I argue that (fundamentally speaking) there are no such things as individuals.